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23 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 JULY 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you, enclosed herewith, the reply of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia regarding the obligations of the Member States pursuant to Security Council resolution 748 (1992) on mandatory sanctions against Libya.

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex were published as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIC
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia fully abides by the provisions of Security Council resolution 748 (1992) and consistently implements the measures imposed against Libya in the resolution.

As of 15 April 1992, all flights to Libya have been cancelled, while Libyan aircraft have not been allowed to land in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Likewise, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has prohibited deliveries of aircraft or aircraft spare parts to Libya, technical, maintenance and other services to Libyan aircraft and spare parts for them, and has taken other measures contained in paragraph 4 of the resolution. There is no Libyan airline office in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia does not export weapons or material to Libya, nor does it sell and transfer weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and spare parts and strictly observes the measures under paragraph 5 (b) and (c).

In accordance with its consistent struggle against international terrorism, the competent authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are taking all necessary measures to prevent persons involved in terrorist activities from entering the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In connection with the above-mentioned, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has committed itself to fully cooperate with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 748 (1992).

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

INTRODUCTION

1. At its 3069th meeting, on 24 April 1992, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 751 (1992) concerning the situation in Somalia. The present report is submitted pursuant to that resolution.

2. Immediately following the adoption of the resolution, I brought its contents to the attention of the Somali leaders and Elders, who had signed in March 1992 the Letter of Agreement addressed to the United Nations committing themselves to work for peace and stability in the country (S/23829, annexes I-IV). I also transmitted copies of the resolution to the Secretaries-General of the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

3. On 28 April 1992, I appointed Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun of Algeria as my Special Representative for Somalia. On 4 May 1992, he took up residence in Mogadishu and established the headquarters of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) there.

I. ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

4. Between 4 May 1992 and 19 July 1992, my Special Representative undertook consultations with various Somali leaders and Elders and other personalities throughout the country. In most of these meetings he was accompanied by the representatives of the LAS, OAU and OIC. He solicited views on the three major elements of his mandate: the monitoring of the cease-fire in Mogadishu, signed on 3 March 1992, and the cessation of hostilities throughout the country; the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance, as well as the need for rehabilitation and institution building; and the process of national reconciliation.

5. In Mogadishu, which is today a divided city, my Special Representative held several meetings, in the southern area, with delegations of the United Somali Congress (USC), including General Mohammed Farah Aidid, whom he also

met at Balad Hawa, Baidowa and Bardhere in the south-west of Somalia. In the north of Mogadishu, he met several times with Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohamed and members of his delegation.

6. In the north-east, he visited Garowe and Bossasso, where he met with delegations of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), including its Chairman, General Mohamed Abshir Musse, and leaders of regional governments, including Mr. Bogor Abdullahi Bogor Musse, the head of the Regional Administration, and Mr. Mohamed Farah Warsame, the Regional Governor.

7. In the north-west, he visited Hargeisa, where he met with a delegation of the self-proclaimed republic of Somaliland, led by its "Foreign Minister", Mr. Sheikh Yusuf Ali Sheikh Maddar, and with Mr. Abdurahman Ahmed Ali "Toor", the president of the self-proclaimed republic, with whom my Special Representative met again in Berbera. In Burao, he met with local leaders, including the Governor, Mr. Hussein Hersi.

8. In the south, my Special Representative met in Kismayo, in the south, with representatives of the USC, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the Southern Somalia National Movement (SSNM), and the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM).

9. He made every effort, wherever he went, to meet with Elders, intellectuals and other leading personalities.

10. He also met in Addis Ababa with Mr. Salim A. Salim, Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, and in Cairo with Mr. Esmat Abdel Meguid, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States.

11. My Special Representative exchanged views with senior officials of the States of the Horn of Africa in Nairobi, Khartoum, Djibouti and Addis Ababa, including Mr. Lissane Yohannes, the Ethiopian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his capacity as the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Somalia, set up by the heads of State of the Horn of Africa. He was also received by the President of Djibouti, Mr. Hassan Gouled Aptidon, and by the President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, Mr. Meles Zenawi.

II. MONITORING OF THE CEASE-FIRE IN MOGADISHU

12. My Special Representative began his consultations by taking up with the leaders of the factions in Mogadishu the question of the immediate deployment of a unit of 50 United Nations observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu, as called for in paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 751 (1992). He also discussed with the leaders of the factions the question of the deployment in Mogadishu as soon as possible, of a United Nations security force as called for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the same resolution.

13. On the very day of his arrival, my Special Representative was informed by Mr. Ali Mahdi that the latter's faction of the United Somali Congress (USC)

accepted the deployment of up to 50 United Nations military observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu and agreed that these observers would be in uniform and unarmed. Mr. Mahdi also accepted the deployment of a United Nations security force in Mogadishu as proposed by the Secretary-General and agreed in principle by the Security Council.

14. On 9 May 1992, my Special Representative met with General Aidid, President of the USC, at Balad Hawa. Notwithstanding his letter of agreement of 27 March 1992 addressed to the United Nations (S/23829, annex I), General Aidid took the position that United Nations personnel monitoring the cease-fire should be unarmed and in civilian attire with some United Nations insignia. He indicated that the strength and status of the United Nations security personnel would require further consultations.

15. After discussions with leaders and Elders in various parts of the country and after difficult further negotiations with USC officials, my Special Representative met again on 21 June in Baidowa in south-west Somalia with General Aidid. On that occasion, General Aidid formally accepted the conditions set by the United Nations that the 50 observers would wear uniforms, which was normal United Nations practice, would be unarmed and would be deployed on both sides of the demarcation line.

16. I thereupon took steps for the deployment of the United Nations observers, whom I proposed to draw from: Austria, Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco and Zimbabwe. The parties were consulted on this list which was then approved by the Security Council (S/24178). With the consent of the Council, I appointed Brigadier General Imtiaz Shaheen (Pakistan) as Chief Military Observer (CMO) of UNOSOM. The CMO, together with three military observers who would constitute the UNOSOM advance party, arrived in Mogadishu on 5 July. The remaining observers were to arrive in Nairobi between 8 and 12 July for onward transport to Mogadishu.

17. On 6 July, the CMO was informed of an incident on 25 June involving an Antonov aircraft which had been under charter by the World Food Programme (WFP). The aircraft was still bearing United Nations markings when it undertook an illegal flight to Mogadishu. The aircraft was said to be carrying Somali currency and military equipment for delivery to the Ali Mahdi faction in Mogadishu. General Aidid's faction thereupon accused United Nations personnel of bias and suspended the deployment of United Nations observers. United Nations Headquarters instructed the CMO to remain at his post, whereupon the USC delivered an "expulsion notice" to him and his party.

18. On 9 July, the Spokesman of the Secretary-General issued the following statement at United Nations Headquarters:

> "The Secretary-General has noted with concern reports alleging that an aircraft previously chartered by the United Nations was subsequently used for the illicit transport of money and military equipment intended for delivery to one of the factions in Mogadishu. The Secretary-General has noted that the aircraft was said to be still carrying the insignia of the

United Nations while engaged in the activity mentioned above. He is taking steps for a full investigation of this incident."

19. My Special Representative returned to Somalia on 12 July and on 15 July reported that General Aidid had agreed to the advance party staying in Mogadishu and to the remaining 47 military observers moving there from Nairobi. However, the deployment of these observers was to be delayed pending assurances from Mr. Ali Mahdi's faction that it would refrain from circulating the newly printed currency which had been brought in on the illegal Antonov flight. My Special Representative secured these assurances on 16 July. General Aidid then gave his consent to the deployment of the military observers. The full complement of observers is due to be deployed in Mogadishu towards the end of the week of 20 July.

20. I continue to take a strong view of the seriousness of the incident involving the Antonov aircraft and intend to pursue actively the necessary investigation and all legal remedies that are available to me.

21. The cease-fire in Mogadishu has held reasonably well since the adoption of Security Council resolution 751 (1992). However, banditry and looting remain a major problem in both parts of the city, with most incidents being attributable to irregular armed groups. Tension in Mogadishu increased noticeably in July as a consequence of the incident relating to the Antonov plane.

22. My Special Representative's efforts to bring about an improvement in the security situation will be greatly facilitated by the impending deployment of the military observers. Their presence will provide a sense of security to those who need to cross from one part of the city to the other. Nevertheless, my Special Representative considers, and I fully agree, that the security problem in Mogadishu cannot be properly addressed unless the United Nations security force called for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Security Council resolution 751 (1992) is deployed. That force will play an important deterrent role not only as regards the safety of the international and local personnel providing humanitarian assistance, but also as regards a general stabilization of the situation in Mogadishu.

III. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND REHABILITATION

23. All the leaders and Elders whom my Special Representative met in Somalia brought to his attention the desperate situation the country faces in terms of needs for humanitarian assistance, recovery programmes and institution-building.

24. Somalia is today a country without central, regional or local administration, and without services: no electricity, no communications, no transport, no schools and no health services. Throughout the country, there are incredible scenes of hunger, disease and dying children.

25. The food situation is critical. Civil conflict has prevented agricultural activity in the normally productive areas of the south, and the north and central regions are suffering from severe drought. The threat of widespread famine in rural areas has become a reality. Food prices are rising sharply everywhere, but most of the population have no money to buy food on the market since virtually all economic activity has been disrupted by war.

26. Over one million children are at risk due to malnutrition. Some 4.5 million people are in urgent need of food assistance. Tens of thousands are in camps; others are isolated and desolate in small groups; hundreds of thousands are refugees in the border areas with Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti; hundreds of thousands more have left the country. Over 300,000 are now registered as refugees in Kenya and, with a daily increase of about 1,000, this could reach some 500,000 refugees in Kenya alone by 1993. Large numbers of refugees are also in Ethiopia, Djibouti and other States in the Horn of Africa. The absence of food is both the cause and the result of the lack of security. Breaking this vicious cycle may be the key to resolving the complex and inextricably linked social and political problems in Somalia.

27. The situation in the health sector is equally grave. Of the estimated 70 hospitals functioning in Somalia in 1988, only 15 remain partially operational today. Most of these hospitals have no water, no electricity, no drugs or even the most basic medical equipment. Malaria, tuberculosis and vaccination programmes have come to a halt with the collapse of the primary health care structure.

28. A potential disaster looms as the sanitary situation throughout the country continues to deteriorate, posing a major threat to public health. Streets are blocked with rubbish. With the onset of the rainy season, the situation could deteriorate even more rapidly. Potable water is no longer available. Large numbers of people are at serious risk of epidemics; an indeterminate number have already died.

29. Livestock is central to the economy of Somalia and its people. Drought has had a severe impact on livestock. In addition, cattle by the thousands are dying of disease in the absence of basic veterinary services and medicines.

30. Under these circumstances, it is inevitable that people in Somalia have begun to lose any sense of hope for the future. There is thus a need not only for life-saving interventions but also for reconstruction activities and institution-building which would offer promise of a better future.

31. The Consolidated Inter-Agency 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, which was brought to the attention of the Security Council in document S/23829/Add.1, provided the initial framework for acceleration of the provision of humanitarian assistance by the United Nations system. In addition, Somalia figures prominently in the two consolidated inter-agency appeals for the Horn of Africa which I issued in February 1992 and in July 1992. These provide details on specific humanitarian assistance programmes for which international assistance is being sought.

32. In accordance with these programmes, and in spite of precarious security conditions which continue to hamper relief activities, the United Nations system, working in close cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations, has made a determined effort to bring humanitarian relief assistance to the affected populations in Somalia. As a part of this process, the operational agencies have re-established a presence in the country, not only in Mogadishu but in other centres where this has been feasible.

33. Although not exhaustive, the following are some highlights of the emergency assistance operations now being carried out by the United Nations system and ICRC:

(a) Since early this year, ICRC and WFP have delivered 60,000 and 19,000 tons of food aid, respectively, and there are currently 213,500 tons in the pipeline. This is against food aid needs estimated to be in the order of 30-35,000 tons per month. The food aid delivered by WFP so far has been distributed mainly in Mogadishu; however, arrangements for the delivery of food aid to Kismayo are being finalized and negotiations for delivery to north-western Somalia through the port of Berbera are at an advanced stage. Assessment missions have been undertaken when security conditions permit to explore the possibility of, and work out modalities for, further deliveries to central and southern Somalia. In addition, WFP has provided assistance in the shipment and distribution of food aid provided directly by bilateral donors, in particular Saudi Arabia.

(b) Since March, a joint WFP/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) airlift has transported over 500 tons of supplementary food from Nairobi to Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa. The airlift continues with two flights a day.

(c) Country-wide activities undertaken by UNICEF include the provision of potable water to towns, villages and displaced camps; training, management and support to mother and child health (MCH) centres; the provision of therapeutic and supplementary feeding supplies, relief and shelter equipment; and educational items for rehabilitation of community schools. UNICEF also facilitates the airlift of essential medical supplies, relief and food items for indigenous and international non-governmental organizations.

(d) The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has used local staff to maintain its programme of assistance to Ethiopian refugees in north-west Somalia and is finalizing plans to re-establish an international presence to deal with returnees.

(e) The World Health Organization (WHO) has contributed approximately $1.2 million to the health sector and is stationing medical officers in Mogadishu, Kismayo, Hargeisa and north-east Somalia.

34. As indicated earlier, Somalia figures prominently in the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals for the Horn of Africa. Total emergency assistance requirements for 1992 are estimated at US$ 117 million, of which only

US$ 41 million has been pledged to date. The specific projects identified in the most recent appeal of 15 July 1992 give an indication of the range of activities which are envisaged, provided sufficient funding is made available:

- Assistance to returnees in north-west Somalia;
- Emergency food aid;
- Infrastructure rehabilitation (ports and airports);
- Emergency health care;
- Water and sanitation facilities;
- Nutritional support and supplementary feeding;
- Public health services;
- Disease control;
- Restoration of veterinary services;
- Rehabilitation of agricultural and livestock water points;
- Support to small-scale farmers;
- Provision of seeds and hand tools.

35. In addition to the project activities outlined above, the July appeal also proposes a new and innovative approach to the problem of the movement of Somali refugees into Kenya. The proposed preventive zone programme is primarily designed to discourage mass movements of people within and across borders by providing assistance to vulnerable groups in or as near to their places of origin as possible. Special coordination and cooperation zones will be established, corresponding approximately to a 50-to-100-kilometre radius on each side of the Kenya-Somalia border, within which United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations will combine their respective expertise to deal with all affected people including refugees, the internally displaced and the conflict or drought-stricken.

36. As noted above, the United Nations is carrying out its emergency assistance programme in Somalia in close cooperation with the ICRC and non-governmental organizations. ICRC has played a vital role in Somalia in providing emergency food assistance, operating "community kitchens", carrying out a livestock vaccination campaign, providing seeds and assisting in the health care sector. ICRC and non-governmental organizations have participated fully in the preparation of the overall emergency programme for Somalia as reflected in the consolidated appeals for the Horn of Africa.

IV. NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

37. All the Somali leaders and Elders repeatedly voiced to my Special Representative their commitment to national reconciliation, especially now that former President Siad Barre has left the country. They stated that this offered new opportunities for national reconciliation. Mr. Ali Mahdi expressed his readiness to cooperate in any way possible in the interest of Somalia. General Aidid stated that he was in contact with other major movements in Somalia and that he was attempting to reconcile differences between the various factions in order to arrive at a common understanding before holding a national reconciliation conference, with the support of the United Nations and the States of the Horn of Africa.

38. The leaders in the north-east expressed their support for United Nations peace efforts and welcomed the moves towards a national reconciliation conference, but emphasized that they could not support the idea of a divided Somalia.

39. The leaders in the north-west were of the view that the premise of any reconciliation should be the acceptance of an independent Somaliland. However, once peace and stability had been achieved both in the north-west and in the south, it would be possible to discuss what form of association could be established between them. There was also a need to reconcile the warring factions within their own self-proclaimed republic. They believed that progress had been made in that direction and this was demonstrated by the reopening of the port of Berbera.

40. All the leaders and the Elders were of the view that there was a need to undertake intense preparations before a national reconciliation conference was called. It was necessary to reconcile warring factions in each region and to develop consensus among the Somalis. It was felt that all major factions, the Elders and intellectuals should be consulted before proceeding to a national reconciliation conference.

41. In the situation that currently prevails there are two major sources of influence remaining in the country, namely the institution of Elders and the political factions. Both must be mobilized and play their part in building a new Somalia. There is a need to consult them and to open lines of communication between them. There is a yearning among the Somali people for dialogue. The United Nations has received numerous pleas from Somalis from all walks of life for it to be a catalyst in this process.

42. With the collapse of government, the institution of Elders, which was used by all successive governments as the intermediary between them and the people, has remained a source of authority in the different regions. The Elders themselves would want to be in the forefront in steering the country towards stability and peaceful reconciliation. There is no doubt that they should not only be consulted, but also be involved as much as possible in the national reconciliation process.

43. Every region in Somalia has become polarized, with disputes and conflicts emerging between members of the same factions. Factions are no longer political or even tribal. They have become fragmented into clans and subclans, in most cases for the defence of local interests or for survival's sake. It is necessary that consensus be developed within each major faction so that when the conference on national reconciliation is held each movement will be represented by persons who can speak for it, and have the authority to make commitments which their followers will respect.

44. My Special Representative also found, in Somalia and abroad, many Somali intellectuals who were eager to submit proposals as to how their country could be rebuilt. They are frustrated and depressed by its present state. The proposals they advance ought not to be ignored.

V. REGIONAL EFFORTS

45. The States of the Horn of Africa have an essential role in assisting and encouraging the process of national reconciliation and it is of the utmost importance that the United Nations continue to consult them.

46. The leaders and high officials of these States informed my Special Representative of the efforts of the High-Level Horn of Africa Standing Committee on Somalia, comprising the Ambassadors of the Sudan, Kenya and Djibouti accredited to Ethiopia and the representative of Eritrea, and briefed the Special Representative fully on the establishment of the committee, its purpose and functions. The Standing Committee was set up by the heads of the States of the Horn of Africa at the humanitarian summit in April. It was charged with the responsibility of following up the resolutions of the conference by working closely with the Somali factions to bring about a cessation of hostilities and the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. It invited all the factions to Bahr Dar for a meeting between 30 May and 5 June. A total of 14 factions and organizations were invited, of which 10 attended. The conference agreed on recommendations on humanitarian assistance, including provisions for the protection and monitoring of aid and secure corridors. On the political side, the parties agreed to hold a national conference which will establish an interim government to lay the groundwork for a democratically elected government.

47. I commend the committee for a significant achievement which can be built upon. As my Special Representative pointed out, the Bahr Dar Agreement did not take into account all aspects of the problem. Some important and significant Somali movements were either absent or not adequately represented. It did, however, establish a good groundwork for our common efforts. The leaders informed my Special Representative of the steps and contacts made so far with various factions in this regard and of their efforts directed at boosting humanitarian assistance.

48. My Special Representative reviewed the efforts undertaken by the States of the Horn of Africa with Mr. Salim A. Salim, Secretary-General of OAU. The

Secretary-General considered that the initiative taken by the Horn of Africa forum towards Somalia should be supported as a regional initiative. However, all Somali factions should be involved in the peace process and national reconciliation. Both my Special Representative and the Secretary-General discussed developments in Somalia in the context of the ongoing cooperation between the United Nations, OAU and other regional organizations on Somalia and agreed on the need for more frequent consultations and exchanges of information on the question.

49. In Cairo, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States pledged the League's cooperation and support for the United Nations efforts in Somalia. He informed my Special Representative that he had written to all members of his organization requesting them to provide emergency relief to the people of Somalia.

50. The Council of Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU gave priority consideration to the situation in and relating to Somalia during their meeting in Dakar from 22 June to 2 July 1992. After an in-depth consideration of the issue, the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution - which was later endorsed by the Summit - by which it, inter alia, "urged the Secretary-General of OAU to work in close collaboration with the Secretary-General of the United Nations towards the implementation of Security Council resolution 733 (1992)". The States of the region were encouraged by the Council "to pursue their efforts aimed at promoting peace in Somalia and preserving regional stability". They were also called upon "to redouble their efforts to convene a national reconciliation conference in close cooperation with OAU, the United Nations, LAS and OIC".

51. During the course of the OAU meetings in Dakar, members of my delegation met on several occasions with representatives of various Somali factions that were present in Dakar. In those discussions, it was agreed that following the deployment of the cease-fire observers in Mogadishu, efforts by the United Nations should from there on concentrate on the delivery of much-needed emergency humanitarian assistance throughout Somalia. In this regard, the representatives of the Somali factions were in agreement that the efforts of the Bahir Dar group should also focus on humanitarian issues.

52. I am very appreciative of the support and cooperation the regional organizations including OAU, LAS, and OIC have extended to the United Nations in our joint efforts to restore peace and security to Somalia and provide humanitarian assistance to those in need.

VI. ARMS EMBARGO

53. It would appear that the situation regarding the flow of arms and ammunition from outside, and the continuing use of military weapons on a large scale inside Somalia, has not changed since my last report on this aspect (S/23829). Meanwhile, by its resolution 751 (1992), the Security Council established a Committee consisting of all the members of the Council to

monitor the implementation of the mandatory arms embargo imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992), and to assist Governments in doing so.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

54. Somalia today is a divided country, fragmented on clan and family lines, without any recognized channels for political action. The quantity of arms in the hands of individuals, factions and groups is enormous. The defeat of the Somali Army which as a result of the cold war became, under former President Siad Barre, one of the best-equipped military machines in Africa, resulted in a vast number of arms falling into the hands of individuals, factions and groups, thus feeding the conflicts as well as the banditry and looting which are taking place all over Somalia. Such activities by independent armed groups are, possibly, the biggest and most serious threat to both the Somalis and the expatriates who work for United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations.

55. The complexity of the situation and the inherent dangers of working in Somalia, combined with the almost total absence of central, regional or local government, pose enormous operational difficulties for the United Nations in establishing a large-scale and effective presence. None the less, the threat of mass starvation facing large segments of the population and the potential renewal of hostilities which could affect peace and stability throughout of the Horn of Africa region require an immediate and comprehensive response from the United Nations and the international community.

56. I have therefore come to the conclusion that the United Nations must adapt its involvement in Somalia. Its efforts need to be enlarged so that it can help bring about an effective cease-fire throughout the country, while at the same time pressing forward with parallel efforts to promote national reconciliation. This will require the Organization to establish a presence in all regions and to adopt an innovative and comprehensive approach dealing with all aspects of the Somalia situation, namely the humanitarian relief and recovery programme, the cessation of hostilities and security, the peace process and national reconciliation, in a consolidated framework.

57. As far as the regions are concerned, I propose to establish four operational zones: the north-west (Berbera), the north-east (Bossasso), the central rangelands and Mogadishu (Mogadishu) and the south (Kismayo). In each of the zones a consolidated United Nations operation will carry out the primary activities envisaged in Security Council resolution 751 (1992), namely:

(a) Humanitarian activities: emergency relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and institution-building;

(b) Monitoring of the cease-fire and containment of potential hostilities;

(c) Security, demobilization and disarmament;

(d) The peace process and national reconciliation efforts through conciliation, mediation and good offices.

58. In its humanitarian activities in Somalia, the United Nations confronts two basic problems: first, securing access to the affected population in such a volatile security situation; and secondly, obtaining the resources necessary to carry out the programme.

59. At the present time, the problem of access and security is the more acute. Without adequate protection for relief personnel and supplies, the implementation of an effective humanitarian relief programme is not possible. The United Nations has sought, and will continue to seek, every opportunity to reach those in need. In the absence of a central authority, this has required a pragmatic approach, fashioning arrangements for distribution of relief supplies with local authorities when and where conditions permit. But the continuing deterioration of the situation in the country makes it clear that this is not enough. A framework for the security of humanitarian relief operations is the sine qua non for effective action.

60. Relevant United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations will be encouraged to strengthen or reactivate their humanitarian and rehabilitation activities in each of the four zones. They will be part of the operational framework, coordinated as appropriate by the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance, as part of UNOSOM, in order to ensure complementarity in the activities of all the agencies and non-governmental organizations engaged in humanitarian relief in Somalia.

61. The decentralized, zonal approach which I am recommending will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the humanitarian operations in Somalia. The use of other ports besides Mogadishu, such as the ports of Kismayo, Bossasso and Berbera, will help increase the quantity of food imported for emergency relief and recovery programmes. Many of the most destitute are located in the interior of the country, not easily accessible from the major ports. The mounting of an urgent airlift operation may be the only way to reach those areas and should be undertaken as soon as possible. There will be a particular need for short landing and take-off aircraft. I have asked the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs to look urgently into this possibility with the agencies concerned.

62. As regards cease-fire monitoring and security, the deployment of the military observers in Mogadishu will be a test as to how such matters can best be handled in a Somali context. I believe that the observers' presence will bring great relief to the population who will be able to cross from one part of the city to the other freely and with less risk.

63. The security situation in Mogadishu continues to be precarious. Looting and banditry remain a widespread problem and attacks on United Nations and non-governmental organization personnel have increased recently. I have asked my Special Representative to pursue his consultations for the deployment of a security force there, as called for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 751 (1992).

64. However, conditions in most of the other regions of Somalia, as described in some of the preceding paragraphs, also call for immediate action. I, therefore, intend to dispatch a technical team to Somalia as soon as possible. Its terms of reference will be to examine inter alia: (a) the possible monitoring of cease-fire arrangements in parts of the country other than Mogadishu; (b) the possible deployment of military observers in the south-west region on Somalia's border with Kenya; (c) the feasibility of an "arms for food" exchange programme, bearing in mind that this would require military personnel adequately armed and equipped for this task; (d) the need for security forces to provide escort and protection for humanitarian aid activities and personnel in other parts of the country; (e) a possible role for the United Nations in assisting the re-establishment of local police forces.

65. All political leaders and Elders in Somalia have requested United Nations assistance in disarming the population and demobilizing the irregular forces. Such a programme has begun in some areas, such as Mogadishu-north and parts of the north-west and the north-east, on the initiative of the local leaders themselves. Some leaders prefer the arms to be destroyed while others suggest that they should be retained for the new regular forces which will be created. My Special Representative, with the help of the Technical Team referred to above, will develop a plan in this regard for application in all four zones. It is also important that the international community continue to enforce the arms embargo as provided for in Security Council resolution 733 (1992).

66. All leaders and Elders in Somalia have also requested United Nations assistance in organizing local police forces. This is an urgent requirement that will also be addressed by the Technical Team.

67. The conflict in Somalia can only be resolved by the people of Somalia themselves in a process of national reconciliation. As stated in resolution 751 (1992) and in my report (S/23829), the objective of the United Nations is to undertake consultations and arrangements for the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia. This is a process that calls for sustained efforts and demands patience and understanding of the regional environment. Important progress on this matter has been made in my Special Representative's consultations with Somali leaders and Elders and he has already begun to discuss alternative venues for the conference. I call upon all the Somali people, leaders of political movements, Elders and spiritual leaders, to close ranks and work together in order to achieve the desperately needed national reconciliation of their country. The international community can assist them only if they give it the opportunity to do so.

68. My Special Representative has already shown that his personal intervention can help to defuse potential local crises. Qualified UNOSOM personnel will accordingly be located in each of the zones to assist in undertaking mediation and conciliation and in arranging for consultative conferences as needed.

69. When UNOSOM was established in Somalia almost two months ago, severe fighting was going on in southern Somalia including Kismayo and as close as 70 kilometres from Mogadishu. There was hardly any contact between north and south Mogadishu and tension was very high. There was also tension and sporadic fighting between different factions in several cities in the north of the country. Despite this precarious situation, every effort has been made to deliver humanitarian assistance. Armed militia from north Mogadishu are now allowed access to the port in the southern zone to escort supplies destined for the population in the north. There is always the risk of a renewal of hostilities. But these are significant developments which must be consolidated and built upon.

70. The desperate and complex situation in Somalia will require energetic and sustained efforts on the part of the international community to break the circle of violence and hunger. The new, comprehensive approach described above is intended to be a catalyst for achieving the vital objective of national reconciliation and the construction of a peaceful, stable and democratic Somalia.

71. I seek the Security Council's approval of the comprehensive and enlarged approach recommended in this report. I will submit a further report to the Council on its implementation as soon as I have received the conclusions and recommendations of the Technical Team which I propose to dispatch to the area. Preliminary estimates of the additional resources required will also be submitted at that time.

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24 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE MISSION DISPATCHED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO INVESTIGATE REPORTS OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN AZERBAIJAN

Note by the Secretary-General

1. In a letter dated 1 June 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/24053), it was stated that the armed forces of Armenia had resorted to using chemical weapons. It was reported that the effects of iprit, cyanide and phosgen were detected during blood tests of wounded Azeris in recent events in Nakhichevan.

2. In identical letters dated 11 June 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council (S/24103), the Permanent Representative reported, inter alia, that 36 documents had been given to the United Nations fact-finding mission recently in Azerbaijan. As indicated in the annex to the letters, some of the documents concerned results of the analysis of tests for use of chemical weapons carried out by the Ministry of Health of the Azerbaijani Republic.

3. On 8 June 1992 the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Armenia addressed a letter to the Secretary-General in which he stated that the accusations concerning the use of chemical weapons by Armenia were completely untrue. He requested that a group of competent experts be dispatched to the conflict zones to assess the situation.

4. From the information provided to the Secretary-General, it appeared that the incidents had occurred in April and May. Notwithstanding the time that had passed and the ambiguity of the reports, in view of the gravity associated with the possible use of chemical, bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons, the Secretary-General decided that an investigation was warranted, on the basis of the guidelines and procedures set out in A/44/561 and endorsed by the General Assembly in 1990.

5. For this investigation, the Secretary-General, under his own authority, appointed a mission of three qualified experts assisted by two members of the

Secretariat. The Security Council was informed of the decision to carry out an investigation during informal consultations on 19 June 1992.

6. The experts appointed were:

Dr. Johan Santesson
Research Director
National Defence Research Establishment, NBC
Defence Department
Umea, Sweden

Mr. Heiner Staub
Chemical Engineer
NC-Laboratory Spiez
Defence Technology and Procurement Agency
Switzerland

Dr. Jan Willems, Colonel MC
Commander, Royal School of the Medical Services
of the Belgian Armed Forces
Ghent, Belgium

The work of the mission was led and coordinated by Mr. Derek Boothby, Principal Officer, Office for Disarmament Affairs of the Department of Political Affairs, who facilitated its organization and ensured liaison with the competent authorities. The team was given communications support by Mr. Woodrow Brown, Electronic Services Division, Department of Administration and Management.

7. The mission arrived in Baku, Azerbaijan, on 4 July 1992. In the course of their investigation, the members visited the areas of Fizuly and Kubatli in southern Azerbaijan, interviewed reported casualties in hospitals in Baku and also visited the chemical and radiometric laboratory of the Civil Defence Headquarters in Baku. On 8 July 1992 the mission visited Erevan, Armenia, for brief discussions with the Armenian authorities, before returning later that day to Geneva.

8. The Secretary-General wishes to express his appreciation to the Governments of Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland for making available the services of the experts, and also to the Government of Switzerland for the provision of the aircraft that enabled the mission and its equipment to be transported efficiently to and from the region.

9. In transmitting the report of the qualified experts (see annex) to the Security Council, the Secretary-General notes that the experts have determined that no evidence of use of chemical weapons was presented to the team.

10. The use of chemical weapons would be a reprehensible act rightly deserving the condemnation of the entire international community. The fact that they do not appear to have been used in the ongoing conflict between

Armenia and Azerbaijan is cause for much relief. But the real solution to the dispute will only be found in the first instance by the end of conflict and the re-establishment of sound relations between the States concerned.

Annex

Report of the mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate reports of the use of chemical weapons in Azerbaijan

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

9 July 1992

Sir,

We have the honour to submit herewith our report on the investigation you requested us to undertake concerning the reports of chemical weapon use in Azerbaijan.

After meeting together in Geneva on 3 July 1992, we visited Azerbaijan from 4 to 8 July 1992 for the purposes of the investigation. Although appointed in our individual capacities, we have worked jointly and our conclusions were reached unanimously. Following the investigation, the entire team made a brief visit to Armenia on 8 July en route for Geneva.

In carrying out our task, we received support from many quarters. In particular, we wish to thank the Government of Azerbaijan for the warm welcome extended to us and the cooperation and assistance given to us throughout our stay.

We also wish to express our appreciation for the assistance and support we received from the United Nations Secretariat, particularly from Mr. Derek Boothby and Mr. Woodrow Brown.

We are honoured, Mr. Secretary-General, to have been of service.

Yours sincerely,

Dr. Johan Santesson

Mr. Heiner Staub

Dr. Jan Willems

His Excellency Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General of the United Nations
New York

I. METHODOLOGY

1. In order to carry out our task, we adopted as required the following methodology:

(a) Interviews with government officials in Baku in order to obtain information regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons;

(b) Visits to Fizuly and Kubatli in order to obtain evidence regarding recent alleged attacks in these areas, including, if applicable, sample collection for chemical analysis in specialized laboratories;

(c) Interviews with a number of patients who were allegedly exposed to chemical warfare agents during various events and with physicians who had treated them;

(d) A visit to the laboratory at which samples collected after various alleged attacks with chemical weapons had been subjected to chemical analysis, in order to review the analytical methods;

(e) Assessment of any further needs for sample taking or examination of patients, including the taking of medical samples;

(f) Assessment and evaluation of the information gathered.

2. The team conducted its investigation in Azerbaijan from the evening of 4 until 7 July 1992. It then proceeded via Erevan in Armenia to Geneva to complete the discussion of the evidence obtained and to finalize its report to the Secretary-General.

3. The team wishes to point out that a considerable delay occurred between some of the earliest occasions of alleged use and the investigation. Furthermore, only very limited information on the alleged use was available when the decision to launch an investigation was taken. On arrival in Baku, the team was informed of very recent events of alleged attacks of chemical weapons of the same main type as the earlier attacks.

4. In this respect, the team would like to stress the importance of being provided, before the commencement of an investigation, with information in the format and of the extent outlined in annex I, appendix I, to document A/44/561.

II. TYPES OF EVENTS IN THE ALLEGED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

5. The team visited the two villages of Fizuly and Kubatli and found both to be in somewhat similar circumstances. Both had been attacked sporadically, one mainly by artillery fire and the other mainly by artillery rockets. One had been almost deserted whereas the other was still inhabited.

6. In Fizuly the team was shown three impact areas. The first produced a hole in a brick wall about half a metre in diameter. There were no casualties and no witnesses but inhabitants in the neighbourhood reported a strange smell to the military brigade headquarters, situated nearby.

7. The second hit a wall in the staircase of the first floor of an official building at about 10 p.m., producing a hole of about 40 cm diameter and partly destroying the door leading from the stairs into a room. Behind the hole on the floor, in addition to the debris of the wall, there were fragments of a shell and more than one hundred nails as used for industrial nailing, 3 cm in length, pointed at one end and with four small wings at the other. Nails were also sticking in the wall about one metre away from the hole and in the doorframe. It was reported that a guard on the stairs at the time of the event was hurt and poisoned. According to the officials present he was evacuated to Baku, but later in Baku was not presented to the team.

8. At the same location a shell was presented which had been found elsewhere in the town. It was the rear part of a 10.5 cm shell, not fragmented, with traces of a greyish powder sticking to the inner surface wall, estimated at less than 10 grammes. It was stated that a person who had handled the shell had developed a rash, but he was not presented.

9. At the third location an explosion had destroyed the upper corner of a small barn, next to an abandoned house. There had been no casualties but a man in the neighbourhood (see appendix II, Medical aspects, case 1) claimed that fruits of the trees in his garden were poisoned. Twice when he had eaten from them, the second time only on the previous day, the fruits had a taste like mustard and after an hour he felt dizzy and had a sore throat, which remained until the time of the interview. Judging that the fruit was quite safe for consumption, examples were eaten by some of the team and the accompanying Azerbaijani personnel. A few minutes later a woman from next door offered the group cherries picked from her garden. There were no ill effects.

10. In Kubatli the team was shown where occasionally artillery attacks with 122-mm artillery rockets (BM-21) had taken place. The team was shown three points of impact. The first rocket had hit a house at about 6.30 p.m. and destroyed part of the upper level. No victims were reported but when the housewife (case 2) who lived in that house tried to pick up some debris of the rocket motor, her hands started to burn. An army major (case 3) examined the debris of the rocket motor the next morning and had developed some hours later a slight rash which made him believe that the rocket contained a poison.

11. The second site visited was an unexploded rocket in the yard of a nearby house. It was not possible to see more than the tail of the rocket motor. No claims were made that the rocket carried a chemical warhead.

12. The third case was a site at which a rocket had exploded in a garden near a rocky road. A woman (case 4) took refuge with her two children under a nearby rock. There were no casualties but signs which the woman had developed made her believe that the rocket had contained a poison.

III. ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY ASPECTS

13. One basis for the allegations of use of chemical weapons was results of chemical analysis of samples taken after attacks. The Civil Defence Laboratory in Baku had analysed several samples of soil, shrapnel, nails, etc., and in many cases obtained a positive result for the presence of cyanide ion. In one case orto-chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS) was identified. No other chemical warfare agents had been detected in samples analysed at the laboratory.

14. The presence of cyanide ion was demonstrated using the cyanogene bromide reaction. To an aqueous extract of the sample was successively added nitric acid, bromine water (to a yellow colour), phenol (to the disappearance of the yellow colour), ammonium nitrate, pyridine and aniline water. A yellow-yellow brown colour was taken to show the presence of cyanide ion. Similarly, CS was detected by the use of a chloramine-based colour reaction.

15. The test for cyanide ion, the Königs reaction, is rather specific since it relies on the unique reaction of CN^+ with pyridine to give glutaconic acid. However, it is not a quantitative analysis but only a qualitative test and traces of cyanide ion can be present in the samples for a variety of reasons not associated with the use of chemical weapons. The specificity of the test CS is not known, but it appears reasonable to assume that many other chemicals might give rise to the same or similar colour reactions. No modern instrumental analytical techniques, such as gas chromatography, mass spectrometry or infrared spectrometry, were available at the laboratory.

16. At the Ministry of Health, the team was offered a number of samples for analysis. Since the samples were said already to have been analysed (and thus to have been extracted) and since the origin of the samples could not be verified independently, the offer was declined.

17. In Fizuly, the team was shown the remnants of a shell containing a greyish residue. It was said that the handling of the shell remnants had caused an unspecified skin rash. A sample of the greyish residue was taken. It appeared to be inorganic in nature, since attempts to ignite it were unsuccessful. In the end, it was decided not to analyse the sample, inter alia since its origin could not be verified independently.

18. Also in Fizuly the team was offered the opportunity to take samples of iron nails which had spread like shrapnel when a projectile exploded in the stairway of a building. A sample was collected but it was subsequently decided not to have the sample analysed since the event involving the nails did not appear to be associated with any convincing signs or symptoms of the use of chemical warfare agents.

IV. DISCUSSION

19. From the first reports of the alleged use of chemical weapons the information was at best ambiguous. The finding of cyanide ion in chemical analyses would only under exceptional circumstances be associated with the use of any of the two chemical warfare agents hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride as both are extremely volatile. Instead, the presence could have a number of natural explanations, including pyrolysis or decomposition of various organic materials.

20. As described to the team in the course of its visits to Fizuly and Kubatli, the events that had taken place were not in any way typical of chemical attacks.

21. The Azerbaijani physicians clearly believed that some casualties of conventional weapon systems were also contaminated by chemical warfare agents. All the cases presented were therefore instances of combined injuries. The number of these cases was small in comparison with the total number of casualties, and they had occurred as single cases randomly dispersed over the zones of conflict.

22. It is unlikely that chemical warfare agents would be used in such a way and that no clusters of contaminated persons, without conventional injury, would have occurred. Furthermore, neither the histories told nor the signs and symptoms observed pointed to any of the recognized chemical warfare agents. However, it should be noted that occasionally individuals may have reacted to chemical substances that are present in conventional weapons.

V. CONCLUSION

23. A number of events were presented to the team as being suggestive of the involvement of use of chemical weapons. However, all these events could also readily be explained by reasons other than chemical weapons; furthermore, none of the events as described to the team agreed with any pattern that would be expected from an attack involving chemical weapons.

24. In sum, no evidence of use of chemical weapons was presented to the team.

Appendix I

Chronology of activities

Friday, 3 July 1992

Team assembled in Geneva

Saturday, 4 July 1992

Travel by air Geneva-Baku

Met by Mr. Albert Salamov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Mrs. Zemfira Guseynova, Deputy Minister of Health

Sunday, 5 July 1992

Visits to Fizuly and Kubatli by Mi-24 helicopter

Monday, 6 July 1992

Interviews with patient and medical staff in Military Medical Hospital

Meeting with Mr. Ragim Husseynov, Minister of Health

Visit to the Chemical and Radiometric Laboratory of the Civil Defence Headquarters

Visit to patients and medical staff in the Institute for Clinical and Experimental Surgery

Visit to patient and medical staff in the Emergency Hospital

Tuesday, 7 July 1992

Consideration of the evidence presented

Visit to General Valeq Barshatli, Deputy Minister of Defence

Visit to Mr. Isa Gambarov, Speaker of the Azerbaijan Parliament

Wednesday, 8 July 1992

Travel by air Baku-Erevan

Visit to Mr. Arman Kirakossian, First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia

Travel by air Erevan-Geneva

Appendix II

Medical aspects

Patients.

Case 1: Male

Place of investigation: Fizuly

Date of investigation: 5 July 1992

History: Fourteen days before, the patient ate a fruit from his garden allegedly exposed to dust coming from an exploding shell that fell about 60 metres away. The taste was strange, not sweet but like mustard, and he felt distress of the digestive tract. Yesterday, he ate another fruit and felt a similar distress.

There are no other people in the surroundings with similar complaints although it was clear that they continued to eat fruits from their garden.

Signs and symptoms:

Nausea, discomfort of the gastro-intestinal tract.

No clinical signs on inspection of mouth and pharynx.

Conclusion: No indication of use of a chemical warfare agent.

Case 2: Female

Place of investigation: Kubatli

Date of investigation: 5 July 1992

History: Female touched the remnants of a shell when cleaning up the debris of the impact. She felt a burning sensation.

No other member of the family presented a similar complaint.

Signs and symptoms:

She complains of a burning sensation in the hands, right shoulder and both legs. There are no clinical signs. At inspection the skin looks intact and not different from other places that did not give this burning sensation.

Conclusion: No indication of use of a chemical warfare agent.

Case 3: Male

Place of investigation: Kubatli

Date of investigation: 5 July 1992

History: Arrived in the village four to five hours after the attack of 2 July (see also case 2). He touched with his hands the remnants of ammunition and developed itching and pain at some spots over the body.

No other people present in that event showed similar complaints.

Signs and symptoms:

Upper edge of the right ear lobe: swelling, induration and desquamation.

Left forearm: area of about 3 cm diameter, pinpoint red papules, itching and pain.

Over both forearms: several pinpoint red papules.

Conclusion: Possibility of contact with an irritating substance. No indication of use of a chemical warfare agent.

Case 4: Female

Place of investigation: Kubatli

Date of investigation: 5 July 1992

History: During the attack (see case 2) she left her home with her two children to hide under a rock. A nearby house was set on fire. After some hours she felt itching and a burning sensation. Her two children did not have any complaints.

Signs and symptoms:

Neck, pars anterior: 3 small lesions, the largest 3 x 1 cm, showing erythema, a few small pustules, desquamation, itching.

Right side of the nose: a small desquamating spot.

Conclusion: Possibility of contact with an irritating substance. No indication of use of a chemical warfare agent.

Case 5: Male

Place of investigation: Baku, Military Medical Hospital

Date of investigation: 6 July 1992

History: 8 May 1992, was hit by a bullet lesioning his left cheek and left upper arm and shoulder, with laceration and necrosis of the upper arm muscles, fracture of the humerus and lesion of the nervus radialis. The patient developed a traumatic shock.

During the surgical intervention, on 9 May 1992, a large bullet was extracted with remnants of a yellow-brown powder. During this extraction the surgeon and the anaesthetist felt tears, spasm of the glottis and coughing. These symptoms disappeared.

Signs and symptoms:

Face: a scar running from the left corner of the mouth over the left cheek.

Left arm: external fixator with plaster reinforcement; closed wound with multiple black spots.

Left hand: oedema, flaccid paralysis, pain by motion.

General condition: seems acceptable.

Conclusion:

Severe lesion produced by a conventional weapon. It seems highly unlikely that a chemical warfare agent has been involved. It is, however, not impossible that the yellow-brown powder present in the bullet contributed to the severity of the lesions of the soft tissues.

Case 6: Male

Place of investigation: Baku, Institute for Clinical and Experimental Surgery

Date of investigation: 6 July 1992

History: The patient had been admitted into the Institute on 2 July, with a bullet in the left regio scapularis and two bullets in the left buttock. The lesions were judged as mild. Nevertheless, the general condition of the patient steadily deteriorated, with fever, tachycardia, purpura and clouding of consciousness. The patient was treated with penicillin.

Toxicological consultant: inadequate expression, rashes, hot skin, hypoxia, superficial breathing, does not eat or speak, decreased cholinesterase activity. Intoxication with a phosphorus-containing substance.

Signs and symptoms:

Very ill man, heart rate 116/min, blood pressure 110/80 mm Hg, temperature 40-41° C, extensive purpura over both legs, upper arm and left shoulder; clouded consciousness, restless.

Under the left shoulder and on the left buttock, one and two holes, respectively, 1 cm diameter, with discoloured edges.

Laboratory results:

Leukocytosis with shifting to the left, with mild thrombocytopenia and increased sedimentation rate.

Conclusion:

Most likely sepsis on the basis of a secondary infection of the shot wounds. No history of signs or symptoms of acute organophosphorus poisoning, the decreased cholinesterase activity probably being related to the bad general condition. No other cases of nerve agent poisoning observed. It seems highly unlikely that a chemical warfare agent has been involved.

The following day, it was mentioned to us that the patient died on 7 July 1992.

Case 7: Male

Place of investigation: Baku, Emergency hospital

Date of investigation: 6 July 1992

History: Patient was wounded on 30 June 1992 with primary closure of skin wounds at the lower left side of the chest and at the left elbow. Upon admission into the hospital, his condition had deteriorated and the chest wound was partially open. During the following days a necrotising wet gangrene developed necessitating excision of the wound edges. Patient receives kanamycin and penicillin.

Signs and symptoms:

Skin defect at the left side of the chest, about the size of the palm of a hand, the underlying ribs and intercostal muscles can be seen. Atonic, pale wound edges, slightly oedematous. Touching the

surrounding of the wound produces pain. Because of the bandages, the wound at the elbow was not inspected.

Conclusion:

Conventional war wound with secondary infection. It seems highly unlikely that a chemical warfare agent has been involved.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Agenda item 68
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

Letter dated 23 July 1992 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit, enclosed herewith, the reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, H.E. Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic, to the letters of 7 and 11 July 1992 addressed to you by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, concerning the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 68, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIC
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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ANNEX

Reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the letters dated 7 and 11 July 1992 addressed to the Secretary-General by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, concerning the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In connection with unfounded and false accusations of the interference of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Bosnia and Herzegovina, contained in the letters of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt dated 7 and 11 July 1992, I wish to point to the following:

As is known, a civil war is raging in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the participation of armed forces of all three constituent peoples of this Republic - Muslims, Serbs and Croats. We recall that as of 19 May 1992 there has been no member of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that the armed forces have carried out no military activities in or against Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia fully abides by Security Council resolutions 752 and 757 and has persistently called on all parties in conflict, including the Serb side, to cease hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to enable delivery of humanitarian aid and to begin negotiations in order to find a lasting political solution to the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia resolutely rejects the accusation of the involvement of its authorities in the alleged expulsion by force of the population from Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of its nationality and religion, including a large number of Muslims.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia deeply deplores the news of the sufferings of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are strongly committed to the cessation of hostilities and enabling the refugees to return to Bosnia and Herzegovina. We therefore cannot understand why the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is being blamed for the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and why a solution is sought only in the withdrawal of the "Serb forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina". We have to reiterate also on this occasion that Bosnian Serbs are a people indigenous to Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of its three constituent peoples, accounting for 31.4 per cent of the overall population (Muslims 43.7 per cent, Croats 17.3 per cent and others 7.6 per cent). Consequently, these Serbs have nowhere to "withdraw" to. Insistence on their "withdrawal from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina" is therefore tantamount to a request that they be expelled from their ancestral homeland.

In order to create conditions for the solution of the problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina, pressure should be brought to bear also on Croatia, whose armed forces are engaged in an overt military intervention and annexation of

parts of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on the Muslim side to agree to negotiations for a political settlement of the crisis.

For its part, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has on several occasions expressed its readiness to accept the deployment of United Nations observers along its borders with Bosnia and Herzegovina and at its airports so as to give proof to the world public that the armed forces and Air Force of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are not engaged in the activities repeatedly attributed to them.

As the letters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt contain accusations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, particularly concerning the treatment of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina, I wish to point out that because of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, over 134,000 persons - one fourth of them Muslims - have taken refuge in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Like all other displaced persons, Muslims were received by the Red Cross and accommodated throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The persons of Muslim or Serbian nationality from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina who decided of their own will to travel abroad and who possessed no personal documents were issued, under Article 20 of the Law on Travel Documents, valid Yugoslav passports. In that way, a number of displaced persons from Bosnia and Herzegovina left willingly for Macedonia, Turkey, Hungary, Austria or Germany, with the possibility to return to the country at a time of their own choosing.

In view of the fact that some United Nations Member States have abused the case of the group of 1,880 persons of Muslim nationality from Zvornik (Bosnia and Herzegovina) who were accommodated in Subotica, accusing Yugoslavia for the expulsion of those persons from its territory, I wish to point out that the persons in question explicitly stated that, because of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they wanted to go abroad and that their destination was Austria and Germany. Relevant records thereon are kept in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In this context, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Belgrade suggested that Yugoslav passports be issued to those persons individually, as they are issued to all other citizens, because of the likelihood that similar cases would appear also in the future. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia issued the passports to all persons in the group of 1,880 Muslims, whereupon they all, of their own will, left the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

As fresh waves of refugees and displaced persons keep coming from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, problems related to their travel to other countries are to be expected in the future. This all the more so, since the growing number of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina on their way to Western European and neighbouring countries has led some of those countries to change

their visa regimes and to refuse to accept, i.e. to begin to return, the refugees from their borders (Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary). The Yugoslav Government will, as in the past, make every effort to solve all the problems related to their status, their stay in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and their requests to go to other countries with the assistance and cooperation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.